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Abstract 
This paper examines whether central banks consider exchange rates and restrictions to capital 
flows when setting the policy rate. Specifically, this paper studies if there is a difference in the 
reaction between inflation targeting central bank and non-inflation targeting central banks in 
advanced and emerging economies. The recent financial crisis is also covered, that is, did the 
crisis change whether central banks are considering movements in the exchange rate as well 
as restrictions to capital flows as determinants of their policy rate. Using a linear monetary 
policy reaction function where the short-term interest rate reacts to expected future inflation 
deviation, output-gap and real exchange rate fluctuations. Then in order to investigate the 
effect of restrictions to capital flows (as measured by the Schindler index) on central bank’s 
exchange rate policy, these variables are included in the policy function. A panel data set of 
48 inflation targeting and non-targeting is employed, and the empirical results suggest that 
short-term interest rates in both advanced and emerging inflation targeting countries react to 
real exchange rate deviations and foreign interest rates. When the whole sample period is 
considered no significant response to the restriction variables is found, however when the 
sample period is divided in to a pre- and post-crisis period a reaction to the restriction 
variables is found. 
Keywords: Inflation targeting, Taylor rule, real exchange rate, Schindler index 
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I. Introduction 
Inflation targeting as a monetary policy framework has been debated since it was first adopted 
by New Zeeland in 1990. As inflation targeting is a relatively recent addition to the monetary 
policy toolbox it is not always defined in the same way, but one definition offered by Mishkin 
(2000) is that inflation targeting can be said to consist of five elements, namely: (i) a public 
announcement of medium-term targets for the level of inflation; (ii) price stability as the 
primary goal of monetary policy enforced by an institutional commitment; (iii) an information 
inclusive strategy in which many variables, and not just monetary aggregates or the exchange 
rate, are used for deciding the setting of policy instruments; (iv) increased transparency of the 
monetary policy strategy through communication with the public and the markets about the 
plans, objectives, and decisions of the monetary authorities; and lastly (v) increased 
accountability of the central bank for attaining its inflation objectives.  
In practice inflation targeting is considered to be flexible which means that central banks aims 
at stabilizing inflation around its target and the real economy, commonly represented by the 
output-gap (deviation of actual output from trend output level) (Svensson 2010). The 
literature on inflation targeting in advanced economies proposes that targeters let their 
exchange rate float freely (Taylor 2001, Svensson 2002) often without interventions and 
capital controls (Rose 2007). Nonetheless, recent empirical studies focusing on both advanced 
and emerging economies (Lubik and Schorfheide 2007, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 2007, 
Aizenman et al. 2011) suggest that short-term interest rates do react to both inflation and 
exchange rates, thus implying that all inflation targeting countries do not after all follow a 
freely floating exchange rate regim. 
From a theoretical standpoint a well-functioning flexible inflation targeting framework 
requires a flexible exchange rate. The rationale for this statement is based on the policy 
dilemma of the impossible trinity (Berganza and Broto 2012). The impossible trinity says that 
the monetary authority can only choose two out of three desirable policy goals: independent 
monetary policy, a fixed exchange rate and perfect capital mobility. As the main goal of 
central banks in inflation targeting countries is to stabilize domestic inflation and the domestic 
output-gap hence domestic short-term interest rates has to be adjusted independently of 
foreign rates whenever inflation deviates from its target (Mukherjee 2011). Consequently, the 
central bank has to choose between a fixed exchange rate and perfect capital mobility. Under 
the assumption of perfect capital mobility, the optimal strategy for the central banks is to 
follow a flexible exchange rate regime. Hence, in this paper I examine whether central banks 
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in inflation targeting countries are considering movements in the exchange rate as well as 
restrictions to capital flows as determinants of their policy rate. 
Therefore the purpose of this paper is to answer the following questions: 
 Do central banks consider exchange rates and restrictions to capital flows when setting 
the policy rate? Is there a difference in the reaction between inflation targeting central 
bank and non-inflation targeting central banks, in advanced and emerging economies? 
 Did the reaction by central banks differ before and after the recent financial crisis? 
In order to answer the above-mentioned questions, I employ a panel data set of 48 countries in 
order to empirically examine a linear monetary policy reaction function where the short-term 
interest rate reacts to expected future inflation deviation (deviation of expected future 
inflation from its target level), output-gap and real exchange rate fluctuations. Then in order 
to investigate the effect of restrictions to capital flows (as measured by the Schindler index) 
on central bank’s exchange rate policy, I incorporate an interaction term between exchange 
rate and the restriction variables and further control for the restriction variables themselves to 
avoid omitted variables problem. The Schindler (2009) index measures de jure restrictions on 
the direction of capital flows, i.e. in- and outflows. When analyzing the policy response de 
jure measures of restrictions are more relevant, since it is these restrictions that policymakers 
control. Thus, making the Schindler index is preferable in the context of policy analysis. 
The empirical results suggest that short-term interest rates in both advanced and emerging 
inflation targeting countries react to real exchange rate deviations and foreign interest rates. 
When the whole sample period is considered no significant response to the restriction 
variables is found, however when the sample period is divided in to a pre- and post-crisis 
period a reaction to the restriction variables is found. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature on inflation 
targeting. Section 3 presents the data and empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses the 
results, and section 5 concludes. 
  
5 
 
 II. Literature Review 
John Taylor showed in his seminal paper (Taylor, 1993) that a simple monetary policy rule 
appropriately describes the conduct of policy by the US Federal Reserve. The Fed raises its 
policy rate when inflation exceeds a 2% implicit inflation target or when real GDP exceeds 
trend GDP. This result has led to a large line of research on Taylor rules and in the literature 
there are two approaches when examining the inflation targeting framework. 
The first approach focuses on the effects of inflation targeting on macro-economic variables 
such as inflation and inflation volatility. The second approach focuses on the characteristics of 
central bank operating procedures, attempting to separate the differences in policy functions 
of inflation-targeting countries and non-targeting countries. Studies belonging to the first 
approach of the empirical literature employ both individual country time-series and multi-
country panel methods, while studies of the second approach mostly focused on individual 
country time-series, however a few studies take an panel approach (see for example Caputo 
and Herrera (2013), Aizenman et al. (2011) and Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007)). This 
paper follows the second approach to examining the inflation targeting framework, and 
thereby contributes to the literature taking a panel approach. 
A. Macroeconomic effects of inflation targeting 
The results from studies focusing on the macroeconomic outcome of implementing inflation 
targeting are mixed. For example, Lin and Ye (2007) evaluate the average treatment effect of 
inﬂation targeting in seven advanced economies (Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, 
Spain, Sweden and the UK) and find that inflation targeting has no significant impact on 
inflation or inflation variablility. On the other hand, when using the same model for 13 
inflation targeting developing countries (Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Israel, South Korea, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa and Thailand) Lin 
and Ye (2009) find that that inflation targeting has significant impact on inflation and 
inflation variablility. Their results show that on average the adoption of inﬂation targeting led 
to a fall in the level of inﬂation by nearly 3 percentage points. 
In an influential cross-section study for 20 OECD countries Ball and Sheridan (2005) find no 
evidence that inflation targeting improves economic performance as measured by the behavior 
of inflation, output, or interest rates. However, it should be noted that the results in Ball and 
Sheridan (2005) has been heavily debated since many of the non-inflation targeters in OECD 
sample have implemented monetary policies that are very similar in practice to formal 
inflation targeting. This generates a lack of sharpness in the classification scheme make the 
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results for the OECD countries hard to interpret. Which as Svensson (2010) notes may in fact 
suggest the opposite conclusion, that is that inflation targeting has instead been relatively 
effective for the OECD countries. For example, when extending Ball and Sheridan’s (2005) 
analysis to a subset of 36 emerging market economies Gonçalves and Salles (2008) find that 
inflation targeting countries compared to non-targeting countries have lower inflation 
volatility and greater inflation reduction. The results by Gonçalves and Salles (2008) are 
consistent with the results in Fraga et al. (2003). On the other hand, in a more recent paper by 
Brito and Bystedt (2010), they argue that once common time trends are controlled for, the 
positive benefit of inflation-targeting regimes disappears and even argue that the disinflation 
period is potentially more recessionary under inflation-targeting. 
B. Policy functions in inflation-targeting regimes 
Most studies that focus on policy functions in inflation-targeting regimes usually consider 
differences in policy regimes by explicitly estimating Taylor rule equations for individual 
countries. A large number of studies in this genre, focusing on advanced economies, find 
some evidence that countries in inflation targeting regimes are following significantly 
different policy rules than countries in non-targeting regimes (see for instance, Corbo et al. 
(2001), Mohanty and Klau (2004), Edwards (2006)). 
Corbo et al. (2001) estimate Tylor rule reaction functions for 17 OECD countries and find that 
inflation targeters exhibit a larger inflation gap coefficient relative to the output gap 
coefficient, although in most cases the coefficients are not significant. Whilst Lubik and 
Schorfheide (2007) use a dynamic structural general equlibrium model for a small open 
economy, where central banks react not only to inflation and output but to exchange rates as 
well. Their estimates show that the central banks of New Zeeland and Australia do not react 
to exchange rates, whereas the central banks of England and Canada do. Meanwhile, Dennis 
(2003) uses a Taylor rule to investigate the role of exchange rates in the Australian monetary 
policy and finds that both inflation and exchange rates are taken into acount when setting 
interest rates. 
Aizenman et al. (2011) find, using panel data for 17 emerging market economies, that among 
the inflation-targeting countries commodity exporters are more exposed to terms-of-trade 
shocks and real exchange rate disturbances. Thus, these countries react more to exchange 
rates compared to non-commodity exporters. Mohanty and Klau (2004) use a modified Taylor 
rule which considers both the inflation and output gap as well as lagged interest rates and 
current and lagged exchange rate changes. They find that the policy resopones of emerging 
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markets central banks to exchange rate changes were larger compared to the response to the 
inflation gap and the output gap, which supports the “fear of floating” hypothesis. 
The larger response to exchange rate changes could also reflect the fact that central banks in 
emerging markets may have dual targets, of stabilizing both the exchange rate and the 
inflation. This argument has been put forward by Amato and Gerlach (2002). They argue that 
in emerging markets financial markets are not well developed and because of the lack of 
depth in the domestic capital market, firms, households and governments in these economies 
borrow in foreign currency. Consequently, movements in the exchange rate has a severe 
impact on the borrower’s balance sheet. Hence, the central bank may be required to increase 
the short-term interest rate severely in response to a depreciation, which violates the 
precondition of exchange rate subordination under inflation targeting. Amato and Gerlach 
(2002) also argue that with a poor track record of monetary stability, the exchange rate also 
serves as a focal point for inflationary expectations. 
Berganza and Broto (2012) uses a panel model to study the intervention of emerging markets 
central banks on exchange rate markets within an inflation targeting framework, and they 
state that these interventions might have implications for monetary policy and the use of 
policy rules. Interventions that may imply a departure from the corner solutions derived from 
the “impossibility Trinity”. Berganza and Broto (2012) also find that exchange rates are more 
volatile in an inflation targeting regime than under other regimes, results which are in line 
with De Gregorio et al. (2005) and Edwards (2006). Berganza and Broto (2012) conclude that 
there is some scope for emerging markets which have adopted inflation targeting to interpret 
the implementation of their inflation targeting regime with certain degree of flexibility. 
C. Shocks, crises and capital controls in inflation-targeting regimes 
The literature regarding how the inflation targeting regime can cope with economic shock is 
less extensive, however Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) using a VAR-panel model 
compare targeters and non-targeters facing oil price shocks. The hypothesis they set out to test 
is the following: if inflation targeting increases credibility of the central bank in anchoring 
price expectations, one could expect targeters to perform better in terms of inflation, and the 
consequences of shocks through exchange rate will be less pronounced. The conclusions of 
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) are in favor of targeters. 
Rose (2007) studies the implications of inflation targeting adoption in terms of exchange rate 
volatility, external reserves accumulation, sudden stops of capital flows and current account 
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balance. Using a sample of 68 countries, including 23 targeters, from 1990 to 2005, the 
conclusions of Rose (2007) are that inflation targeters have lower exchange rate volatility and 
face less frequent sudden stops of capital flows than similar non-targeters. The current 
accounts or international reserves of inflation targeting countries do not look different from 
non-targeters. Lin (2010) conducts a study similar to that of Rose (2007). Using propensity 
score matching, he finds that for developing countries, inflation targeting reduces the 
exchange rate volatility and increases external reserves accumulations. On the other hand, for 
industrial countries, inflation targeting increases in exchange rate volatility and lowers 
external reserves accumulation. 
One of few who have analyzed the recent financial crisis effect on inflation targeters and non-
targeters using a panel method is de Carvalho Filho (2010, 2011). With panel estimates and a 
difference in difference approach, covering 51 countries, including 23 inflation targeters, de 
Carvalho Filho (2011) finds that countries which adopted inflation targeting faced lower 
decrease in GDP growth. This result is challenged by Fouejieu (2013) who finds that when 
controlling for the exchange rate regime there is no significant difference between targeters 
and non targeters when it comes to GDP growth during the crisis. However, when it comes to 
magaging the increase in the real interest rate and increased inflation volatility Fouejieu 
(2013) finds that inflation targeting central banks perform better compared to non-targeting 
central banks. 
Xafa (2008) notes that inflation targeting countries have imposed capital controls to 
discourage capital flows and reduce appreciation pressure, e.g. Chile in 1991, Thailand in 
2006, and Colombia in 2007. However, the empirical evidence on whether capital controls are 
effective in slowing capital flows are mixed, and over the longer term, one can argue that 
markets will find ways around the controls. Nevertheless, using high frequency data for Chile 
from 1991 to 1998, Edwards and Rigobon (2009) found that a tightening of capital controls 
resulted in a depreciation of the domestic currency in Chile. While Coelho and Gallagher 
(2010) find that capital controls on inflows were modestly successful in Colombia and 
Thailand in reducing the overall of capital inflows, reducing exchange rate appreciation and 
volatility, however the experience in Thailand was less successful than Colombia. Ostry et al. 
(2010) conclude that there may be circumstances in which capital controls are a legitimate 
part of the policy response to surges in capital inflows. Mukherjee (2011) empirically 
examine whether the responsiveness of the interest rate to exchange rate fluctuations can be 
explained in terms of limited capital openness does find that short-term interest rates do 
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respond to real exchange rate fluctuations. However, the responsiveness of the interest rate to 
the exchange rate declines significantly as capital market openness increases. 
Thus several empirical studies (e.g. Mohanty and Klau 2004, Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), 
Aizenman et al. (2011)) suggest that that in some inflation targeting countries central banks 
respond sytematically to both inflation and exchange rates and there is some recent literature 
(Edwards and Rigibon (2009), Ostry et al. (2010), Coelho and Gallaher (2010)) suggesting 
that controls on capital inflows versus capital outflows may have very different impact on real 
exchange rate volatility. Further, although the literature to date offers explanations why the 
inflation targeting countries, especially the emerging markets react to exchange rate changes, 
the impact of controls on capital inflows versus capital outflows on the responsiveness of the 
interest rate to exchange rate movements is still relatively unexplored and lack a panel 
approach including both emerging and advanced economies. Therefore, in this paper, I 
examine whether the inflation targeting countries are imposing restrictions on capital flows to 
manage exchange rate movements while maintaining an independent monetary policy. 
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III. Data and Empirical Methodology 
A.  Estimation equation 
The short-term interest rate is chosen as the monetary policy instrument in inflation targeting 
countries. Following the extensive literature that has emerged since Taylor (1993), the 
following monetary policy reaction function is assumed to be a forward-looking and a linear 
one (Aizenman et al. 2011, Caputo and Herrera 2013), where the target interest rate responds 
to expected future inflation deviation, output-gap and exchange rate deviations: 
               (  [     ]    
 )     (      ̅  )       
                (1) 
where π is the expected CPI inflation rate in t+1,    is the target inflation rate,     is the 
output of country i at time t,  ̅   is the trend output of country i at time t and      is an 
exogenous random shock to the interest rate and is assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed. As seen in equation (1) the current interest rate (  ) is assumed to 
depend on its own lagged value, in accordance with the strong empirical evidence (English et 
al. 2003, Clarida et al. 1998), where the parameter ρ represents the degree of interest rate 
smoothing. 
Following Caputo and Herrera (2013) I will also consider the foreign interest rate,   
 , as one 
of the determinants of the policy rate. The variables in     are possible additional determinants 
of the policy rate, namely the deviation of the real effective exchange rate from trend and the 
variables reflecting controls on capital in- and outflows (      and       respectively, see 
Appendix B for more details about their composition). More precisely, as in Mukherjee 
(2011) an interaction term in between the variables on controls on capital in- and outflows 
and the exchange rate deviations, and to avoid omitted variable bias the variables on controls 
on capital in- and outflows themselves will also be controlled for. 
The rationale for estimating a forward-looking Taylor rule is, firstly, that by explicitly 
including expected inflation in the reaction function makes it easier to unravel the link 
between the estimated coefficients and central bank objectives. In fact, as note by Clarida et 
al. (1998) it is not clear from the simple contemporaneous Taylor specification whether the 
central bank responds to the output gap independently of concern about future inflation, or if 
the output gap is in fact a target. Secondly, by having the central bank respond to forecasts of 
inflation, output and other contemporaneous variables, one incorporates a more realistic 
feature of policy-making, specifically that central banks consider a broad array of information 
(Caputo and Herrera 2013). 
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In the spirit of Aizenman et al. (2011) the inflation target variable,   , is assumed to be time 
invariant for each country and is therefore subsumed in the country fixed effect parameter,   . 
                  (  [     ])     (      ̅  )       
                (2) 
The specification in (2) includes an inertial element in the Taylor rule. This is useful to 
introduce in order to reflect the fact that monetary policy changes only gradually as new 
information becomes available. Therefor in this context, the coefficients in (2), and 
subsequent equations, can be interpreted as short-run policy responses
1
. 
B.  Data 
In order to investigate if there is a difference in the reaction to exchange rates between 
inflation targeting central bank and non-inflation targeting central banks in advanced and 
emerging economies data for 22 inflation targeting countries and 26 non-targeting countries is 
used. Of the 48 countries 29 are classified as advanced economies and 19 are classified as 
emerging market economies according to IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO). The data 
sample was restricted by the country coverage of the Schindler index. 
The 48 countries in my dataset are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chile, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Thailand, Turkey and United Kingdom. See Appendix A for more details on the countries 
included in the sample. 
The main data source used in this paper is IMF’s International Financial Statistics database. 
For inflation targeting countries the data set ranges from a time when a particular country 
started targeting inflation through 2012 at annual frequency
2
. The start year for the data on 
non-targeting countries is 1995
3
 and ranges through 2012 at annual frequency. Thus, the panel 
data set used will be an unblanced one. Data on the money market rate has been used as a 
proxy for short-term nominal interest rate. The money market rate in United States has been 
used as a proxy for the foreign interest rate, which is the reason why the United States is not 
included in the sample. Inflation is calculated as the time difference of the log CPI. The 
                                                     
1
 Long-run coefficients are thus obtained by dividing the estimates by  
 
   
. 
2
 The Schindler index is only available at annual frequency. 
3 The start year selected was start year of the Schindler (2009) index, i.e. 1995. 
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output-gap is constructed by subtracting the trend level of real-GDP from actual real GDP 
where the trend real GDP is calculated using Hodrick-Prescott filter (smoothing parameter 
100). Correspondingly, the data for real exchange rate deviation is constructed by subtracting 
the trend real exchange rate (calculated using Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing 
parameter 100), from the actual real effective exchange rate. Thus, an increase in the 
exchange rate is considered as a real depreciation of the domestic exchange rate. The 
Schindler (2009) index is used to measure de jure restrictions on the direction of capital flows, 
i.e. in- and outflows. When analyzing the policy response de jure measures of restrictions are 
more relevant, since these restrictions are the ones that policymakers control. Thus, making 
the Schindler index is preferable in the context of policy analysis. The index lies between 0 
and 1, and a lower value means a more financially open economy, see Appendix B for a 
further discussion on the construction of the Schindler index. 
Summary statistics for all the variables are reported in Table 1. Columns (1)-(3) report the 
mean and standard deviation for the inflation-targeting countries in the sample, columns (4)-
(6) reports the mean and standard deviation for the non-targeting countries in the sample. 
  
13 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Inflation-targeters Non-targeters 
Variable Full 
Sample 
(1) 
Advanced 
economies 
(2) 
Emerging 
economies 
(3) 
Full 
Sample 
(4) 
Advanced 
economies 
(5) 
Emerging 
economies 
(6) 
Capital inflow 
restriction 
0.291 
(0.256) 
0.196 
(0.174) 
0.435 
(0.299) 
0.279 
(0.334) 
0.150 
(0.224) 
0.573 
(0.357) 
Capital outflow 
restriction 
0.345 
(0.368) 
0.188 
(0.260) 
0.582 
(0.371) 
0.363 
(0.390) 
0.2173 
(0.287) 
0.692 
(0.392) 
Inflation 0.073 
(1.052) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.176 
(1.666) 
-0.056 
(1.244) 
0.002 
(0.034) 
-0.193 
(2.247) 
Interest rate 3.762 
(5.043) 
0.990 
(2.063) 
7.952 
(5.322) 
5.166 
(11.755) 
3.183 
(2.485) 
9.657 
(20.252) 
Output gap 2.692 
(3.979) 
4.467 
(4.290) 
0.008 
(0.024) 
0.005 
(0.034) 
0.005 
(0.027) 
0.004 
(0.046) 
Real effective 
exchange rate 
change 
1.468 
(2.146) 
2.190 
(2.312) 
0.377 
(1.238) 
0.001 
(0.049) 
0.002 
(0.034) 
0.000 
(0.072) 
US money 
market rate 
2.627 
(2.122) 
2.964 
(2.153) 
2.117 
(1.959) 
3.167 
(2.2283) 
3.160 
(2.228) 
3.181 
(2.221) 
Number of 
observations 
321 193 128 468 325 143 
Mean and in parenthesis standard deviation  
Before estimating the Taylor rule, unit root tests are performed to control that the series are 
stationary. As shown in Table 2, the null hypothesis of common unit root can be rejected in 
all cases, based on the results from the Levin et al. (2002) and the Breitung (2000) tests. 
Table 2: Panel Unit Root Tests 
 Inflation-targeters Non-targeters 
Variable LLC Breitung LLC Breitung 
Capital inflow 
restriction 
-12.2370*** -8.2313*** -8.3954*** -6.0736*** 
Capital outflow 
restriction 
-10.6083*** -5.0077*** -6.4708*** -4.7052*** 
Inflation -13.8901*** -4.6123*** -244.585*** -3.3986** 
Interest rate -5.9238*** -4.1169*** -11.6210*** -3.1522** 
Output gap -5.5053*** -2.0639** -3.6073*** -2.5900** 
Real effective 
exchange rate change 
-10.5416*** -2.0117** -3.6373*** -4.4754*** 
US money market 
rate 
-9.7796*** -8.9152*** -7.3084** -14.2613*** 
Null hypothesis: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
** Indicate the significance level at 5%. 
*** Indicate the significance level at 1%. 
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C. Empirical estimation 
The method used to estimate the forward-looking Taylor rule in equation (2) is the same as in 
Caputo and Herrera (2013) and Aizenman et al. (2011) in order to insure comparability of the 
results. However, when estimating an equation as the one in (2) one faces two problems. The 
first one is that when the time dimension (T) of a panel with a lagged dependent variable is 
small, estimations are biased (Aizenman et al. 2011). The second problem, noted by Caputo 
and Herrera (2013), is that the correlation between the error term in equation (2) and expected 
inflation used as regressor in the Taylor rule regression could produce biased and inconsistent 
estimates and this independently of the size of the time dimension (T). 
In order to correct the first problem, a country fixed-effects least-squares estimation procedure 
(LSDV) is used to correct the bias generated by the presence of a lagged dependent variable. 
As shown by Judson and Owen (1999) the LSDV estimator performs well in a panel with a 
large T. 
Now, in order to correct the bias generated by the correlation between the error term and the 
explanatory variable, the LSDV estimator is estimated using an instrumental variable 
approach, as in Caputo and Herrera (2013). More precisely, the unobserved expected inflation 
is removed by rewriting the policy rule in equation (2) in terms of realized variables, as 
follows: 
                           (      ̅  )       
                (3) 
where the error term,     ,is a linear combination of the forecast errors of inflation and the 
exogenous errors,     . In order to proceed with the instrumental variable estimation one needs 
to define a vector of variables within each central bank’s information set, called    . This 
vector is, at the time each central bank chooses its interest rate, orthogonal to      (Verbeek 
2012, Clarida et al. 1998). In other words meaning that  (    |   )    . This condition, along 
with equation (3), implies the following set of orthogonality conditions used for estimation: 
 (                            (      ̅  )       
    
 
   |   )     (4) 
Now, when estimating the parameters of interest, the set of instruments,    , used includes 
lagged values of the output gap, inflation , the policy rate, and the variables included in 
     the deviation of the real effective exchange rate from trend and the variables reflecting 
restrictions to capital in- and outflows and the interaction terms between these variables. 
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IV. Estimation results 
A. Main results 
This section discusses the results from the whole sample, i.e. the difference between inflation 
and non-inflation targeting central banks. The results from the estimation using the full 
sample are presented in Table 3. For the inflation targeting sample (column 1), all the 
variables in the benchmark Taylor rule are significant and an interesting result is that central 
banks in an inflation targeting regime seem to react to foreign rates (US money market rate) 
which are consistent with results in Caputo and Herrera (2013). Another result shown in 
Table 3 is that the lagged interest rate is highly significant and that the value of ρ is quite high 
reflecting a high degree of persistence, results which are consistent with Clarida et al. (1998). 
The high degree of persistence shows that central banks react slowly as new information 
becomes available. 
The estimation results from the benchmark model also holds for the extended model, i.e. 
significant reaction to foreign rates and high degree of persistence (see column 2). For the 
extended Taylor rule the exchange rate deviation is significant, thus suggesting that central 
banks in inflation targeting countries are considering the exchange rate when setting the 
policy rate. However, neither of the variables reflecting restrictions to capital in- and outflows 
nor their interaction with the exchange rate deviation is found to be significant. 
The results for the non-targeting sample are quite similar to the ones for the inflation targeting 
sample. All the variables in the benchmark Taylor rule are significant (column 3) and once 
again the foreign rate is highly significant and there is a high degree of persistence. The 
results for the extended Taylor rule show that central banks in non-targeting countries do not 
consider the exchange rate deviation nor do they consider variables reflecting restrictions to 
capital in- and outflows. 
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Table 3: Forward-Looking Taylor Rules Estimates 
  Inflation-targeters Non-targeters 
Variable Coefficient Benchmark 
Taylor rule 
(1) 
Extended 
Taylor rule 
(2) 
Benchmark 
Taylor rule 
(3) 
Extended 
Taylor rule 
(4) 
            0.366 
(0.737) 
 -0.477 
(0.422) 
            -0.145 
(0.599) 
 -0.457 
(0.318) 
         -0.312*** 
(0.047) 
-0.318*** 
(0.047) 
-0.242** 
(0.104) 
0.042 
(0.152) 
        0.378** 
(0.143) 
0.402*** 
(0.144) 
0.408*** 
(0.060) 
0.379*** 
(0.053) 
      ̅      -0.014*** 
(0.005) 
-0.016*** 
(0.004) 
6.917*** 
(1.880) 
8.413*** 
(2.446 
      ̅       0.010** 
(0.005) 
 1.809 
(2.411) 
(      ̅  )               -0.164 
(0.339) 
 -18.045 
(13.140) 
(      ̅  )               0.075 
(0.246) 
 2.745 
(11.648) 
  
      0.036*** 
(0.008) 
0.032*** 
(0.008) 
0.340*** 
(0.052) 
0.355*** 
(0.050) 
Long Run Coefficients 
π -0.501 -0.532 -0.408 0.067 
   ̅ -0.022 -0.027 11.689 13.540 
   ̅  0.016  2.911 
Observations 275 275 415 415 
R
2
 adjusted 0.9149 0.9154 0.8223 0.8224 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
* Indicate the significance level at 10%. 
** Indicate the significance level at 5%. 
*** Indicate the significance level at 1%. 
B. Advanced and emerging sub-sample analyses 
This section discusses if the central bank policy rule differs among advanced and emerging 
economies, Table 4 reports the results from the sample of advanced economies whilst Table 5 
reports the results from the emerging sample. 
As shown in Table 4 the results from the advanced sample are similar to the main results 
discussed in the previous section. That is, for both the benchmark and the extended Taylor the 
foreign rate is significant and there is a quite a high degree of persistence. Again the 
difference between the non-targeting and targeting countries seem to be that inflation 
targeting central banks in advanced economies also consider the exchange rate deviations 
when setting the policy rate. For the advanced sample there is one result that is different to the 
main results, which is that the interaction term between the exchange rate deviations and the 
variable reflecting restrictions to capital outflows. Thus, suggesting that apart from exchange 
rate deviations the central banks in advanced economies also consider its interaction with 
controls on capital outflows. 
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Table 4: Forward-Looking Taylor Rules Estimates – Advanced Economies 
  Inflation-targeters Non-targeters 
Variable Coefficient Benchmark 
Taylor rule 
(1) 
Extended 
Taylor rule 
(2) 
Benchmark 
Taylor rule 
(3) 
Extended 
Taylor rule 
(4) 
            -0.510 
(0.334) 
 -0.253 
(0.454) 
            0.334 
(0.230) 
 -0.6589** 
(0.289) 
         0.638 
(1.245) 
-1.016 
(1.658) 
8.953 
(19.724) 
2.043 
(16.716) 
        0.438*** 
(0.155) 
0.452*** 
(0.151) 
0.474*** 
(0.073) 
0.460*** 
(0.070) 
      ̅      -0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.006* 
(0.004) 
10.560*** 
(2.556) 
11.332*** 
(2.330) 
      ̅       0.009** 
(0.004) 
 -0.711 
(2.423) 
(      ̅  )               0.216 
(0.1314) 
 -21.227 
(20.789) 
(      ̅  )               -0.156* 
(0.091) 
 0.733 
(12.049) 
  
      0.010* 
(0.006) 
0.010** 
(0.005) 
0.319*** 
(0.054) 
0.332*** 
(0.050) 
Long Run Coefficients 
Π 1.135 -1.855 17.005 3.779 
   ̅ -0.009 -0.011 20.058 20.965 
   ̅  0.017  -1.316 
Observations 170 170 288 288 
R
2
 adjusted 0.9275 0.9200 0.8530 0.8585 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
* Indicate the significance level at 10%. 
** Indicate the significance level at 5%. 
*** Indicate the significance level at 1%. 
In Table 5 the results from the emerging sample is shown. Again the results are similar to the 
main results, central banks in inflation targeting countries seem to consider the foreign rate as 
well as the exchange rate deviation as determinants of the policy rate. Another interesting 
result found in Table 5 is that for non-targeting emerging economies the exchange rate 
deviation is significant. All the results for the emerging sample are consistent with the ones in 
Aizenman et al. (2011). 
For both inflation targeters and non-targeters in the emerging sample neither of the variables 
reflecting restrictions to capital in- and outflows nor their interaction with the exchange rate 
deviation is found to be significant. 
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Table 5: Forward-Looking Taylor Rules Estimates – Emerging Economies 
  Inflation-targeters Non-targeters 
Variable Coefficient Benchmark 
Taylor rule 
(1) 
Extended 
Taylor rule 
(2) 
Benchmark 
Taylor rule 
(3) 
Extended 
Taylor rule 
(4) 
            0.572 
(1.749) 
 -0.957 
(1.952) 
            -0.550 
(2.331) 
 3.447 
(2.405) 
         -0.245*** 
(0.040) 
-0.260*** 
(0.043) 
-0.206 
(0.137) 
-0.231 
(0.152) 
        0.339*** 
(0.111) 
0.397*** 
(0.124) 
0.387** 
(0.063) 
0.353*** 
(0.078) 
      ̅      22.337** 
(9.976) 
24.286** 
(9.234) 
 0.748 
(8.564) 
      ̅       0.919* 
(0.531) 
 4.038* 
(2.309) 
(      ̅  )               -0.410 
(0.3690) 
 -72.765 
(51.953) 
(      ̅  )               -20.530 
(35.713) 
 -41.271 
(48.735) 
  
      0.249** 
(0.114) 
0.212* 
(0.121) 
3.326 
(6.712) 
0.165 
(0.127) 
Long Run Coefficients 
Π -0.370 -0.430 -0.337 -0.365 
   ̅ 33.770 40.248 5.426 1.156 
   ̅  1.522  6.235 
Observations 105 105 127 127 
R
2
 adjusted 0.8032 0.8011 0.6614 0.6443 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
* Indicate the significance level at 10%. 
** Indicate the significance level at 5%. 
*** Indicate the significance level at 1%. 
Thus, the results from both the emerging and advanced sample are similar to the main results 
in the previous section. Central banks in an inflation targeting regime in both samples seem to 
consider the foreign rate and the exchange rate deviations as determinants of the policy rate. 
Inflation targeting central banks thus attempt to “lean against the wind” and stabilize the 
exchange rates by increasing interest rates in response to real exchange rate depreciation. 
Non-targeting emerging-market central banks also respond to real exchange rates when 
setting interest rates. It is notable that the real exchange rate response is smaller for inflation 
targeters compared to the non-targeters. Thus, even if inflation targeting central banks attempt 
to “lean against the wind” their actions are seemingly more constrained by the commitment to 
target inflation than the non-targeters in how pro-actively this objective is followed. 
The results from the estimation of forward-looking Taylor rules, namely a significant reaction 
exchange rate deviation, foreign rates and high degree of policy inertia, measured by the 
lagged interest rate coefficient, and confirms the results in Aizenman et al. (2011), Caputo 
and Herrera (2013) and Clarida et al. (1998). 
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C. Robustness check 
As a robustness check of the results described in the two previous sections, the benchmark 
and extended Taylor rule are estimated for the inflation targeting sample using the start dates 
provided by Rose (2007). This means that instead of using the offical date of adoption of 
inflation targeting as the start of the sample period, the “start date” is when the effect of 
inflation targeting is noticed. Using a “start date” other than the offical means that one takes 
into account that there may be a lag between the announcement of inflation targeting and 
actual implementation of an inflation targeting regime (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 2007). 
The results are shown in Table 6. 
The results using different start dates are consistent with the ones using the official start date, 
as shown in Table 6 the exchange rate deviation and the foreign rate seem to be part of the 
policy rule both advanced and emerging economies. Once again the variables reflecting 
restrictions to capital in- and outflows are not significant in any sample, and it is only for 
advanced economies that one of the interaction terms is significant, the between the exchange 
rate deviations and the variable reflecting restrictions to capital outflows (same result as when 
using official start dates). 
Table 6: Forward-Looking Taylor Rules – different start dates 
  All targeters Advanced economies Emerging economies 
Variable Coefficient Benchmark 
Taylor rule 
(1) 
Extended 
Taylor rule 
(2) 
Benchmark 
Taylor rule 
(3) 
Extended 
Taylor rule 
(4) 
Benchmark 
Taylor rule 
(5) 
Extended 
Taylor rule 
(6) 
              0.390 
(0.664) 
 -0.367 
(0.406) 
 -0.186 
(1.920) 
                0.408 
(0.276) 
 -0.039 
(2.354) 
           0.325*** 
(0.047) 
0.328*** 
(0.045) 
0.166 
(1.934) 
0.466** 
(0.183) 
0.258*** 
(0.039) 
0.266*** 
(0.039) 
          0.444*** 
(0.159) 
0.461*** 
(0.159) 
0.437** 
(0.199) 
0.440** 
(0.197) 
0.406*** 
(0.119) 
0.450*** 
(0.116) 
      ̅        -0.013*** 
(0.005) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
25.589*** 
(9.226) 
27.337*** 
(8.725) 
      ̅         0.021** 
(0.008) 
 0.020*** 
(0.005) 
 1.011* 
(0.517) 
(      ̅  )  
       
        -0.169 
(0.294) 
 0.164 
(0.1599) 
 -0.285 
(0.376) 
(      ̅  )  
       
        -0.181 
(0.244) 
 -0.192* 
(0.114) 
 -26.204 
(34.953) 
  
        0.023*** 
(0.007) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.507*** 
(0.187) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
3.668*** 
(0.876) 
2.989*** 
(0.971) 
Long Run Coefficients 
π 0.585 0.609 0.295 0.832 0.434 0.484 
   ̅ -0.023 -0.020 -0.012 -0.011 43.079 49.704 
   ̅  0.039  0.036  1.838 
Observations 264 264 163 163 101 101 
R
2
 adjusted 0.9178 0.9177 0.9252 0.9260 0.8326 0.8444 
Source: Rose (2007) Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
* Indicate the significance level at 10%. 
** Indicate the significance level at 5%. 
*** Indicate the significance level at 1%. 
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D. Response after the financial crisis 
In order to assess if the determinates of central bank policy rules have changed after the recent 
financial crisis, the sample is divided into a pre- and post-crisis period. The pre-crisis period 
consists of the years from adoption of the inflation targeting regime until 2007, the crisis 
period is 2008-2009 and the post-crisis period is 2009-2012, as in Fouejieu (2013). The 
estimation results from the sub-sample analysis is found in Table 7. Here only the extended 
Taylor rule is considered, and the results for all targeting countries suggest that after the crisis 
central banks are considering the restriction variables as well as exchange rate deviations in 
their policy rules. However, there is a difference between the central banks in advanced and 
emerging economies. Where emerging market central banks seem to react to the interaction of 
the restriction variables with the exchange rate deviations, whereas advanced economies 
central banks seem to react to capital inflows. Thus the results are somewhat inconclusive but 
suggest that after crisis inflation targeting central banks seem to consider restrictions to 
capital flows in some sense as well as foregin rates and exchange rate deivations. The results 
supports Ostry et al. (2010) conclusion that capital controls may be a legitimate part of policy 
response. 
Table 7: Policy Response Before and After the Financial Crisis 
  All targeters Advanced economies Emerging economies 
Variable Coefficient Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
             0.536 
(1.238) 
7.096*** 
(2.201) 
-0.100 
(0.343) 
3.808* 
(1.388) 
-0.457 
(1.945) 
2.707 
(1.820) 
             -0.658 
(1.235) 
-6.475** 
(2.913) 
0.052 
(0.227) 
-1.296 
(1.093) 
-1.939 
(2.569) 
-0.774 
(4.465) 
           0.857** 
(0.341) 
1.338* 
(0.654) 
2.146*** 
(0.520) 
4.845*** 
(0.389) 
0.935** 
(0.453) 
0.070*** 
(0.015) 
          0.277* 
(0.165) 
0.690*** 
(0.187) 
0.402* 
(0.213) 
0.171 
(0.174) 
0.255** 
(0.104) 
0.187*** 
(0.039) 
      ̅        0.002 
(0.069) 
0.004 
(0.201) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.059** 
(0.014) 
7.681*** 
(2.738) 
6.515*** 
(0.242) 
      ̅        0.011 
(0.091) 
0.243*** 
(0.019) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.032*** 
(0.001) 
0.536 
(1.528) 
0.510** 
(0.177) 
(      ̅  )  
       
       -0.110 
(0.637) 
-2.602** 
(1.114) 
0.055 
(0.138) 
1.039* 
(0.024) 
-0.644 
(0.757) 
267.279*** 
(45.246) 
(      ̅  )  
       
       0.241 
(0.514) 
3.162* 
(1.653) 
-0.043 
(0.094) 
0.838 
(0.497) 
-27.476 
(51.199) 
190.353*** 
(59.530) 
  
        0.095*** 
(0.029) 
8.851* 
(4.665) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.244* 
(0.071) 
0.127 
(0.175) 
11.562*** 
(1.729) 
Observations 187 44 126 22 61 22 
R
2
 adjusted 0.936 0.947 0.948 0.941 0.810 0.946 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
* Indicate the significance level at 10%. 
** Indicate the significance level at 5%. 
*** Indicate the significance level at 1%. 
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V. Conclusions 
Using data for 48 countries, both inflation targeting and non-targeting countries, this paper 
aims to investigate whether central banks in consider exchange rates and restrictions to capital 
flows when setting the policy rate. One of the purposes of this paper was to examine if there 
was a difference between advanced and emerging economies, and the results show that the 
reaction to exchange rate deviations is large and significant for central banks in both advanced 
and emerging economies. Inflation targeting central banks attempts to “lean against the wind” 
and stabilize the exchange rates by increasing interest rates in response to real exchange rate 
depreciation. The results also show that central banks in an inflation targeting regime seem to 
react to foreign rates since it is found to be highly significant in both advanced and emerging 
inflation targeting economies. Here the results differ to the non-targeting sample, where 
foreign rates seem to play a bigger role to central banks in advanced economies than in 
emerging economies. 
Another interesting result is the high degree of persistence, meaning that central banks react 
slowly as new information becomes available. This result also holds for the non-targeting 
sample. 
However, the results for the variables reflecting restrictions to capital in- and outflows are 
found to be not significant, only the interaction of the exchange rate deviation and the variable 
reflecting restrictions to capital outflows is found to be significant for central banks in 
inflation targeting advanced economies. Thus when the entire time period is considered 
central banks seem not to react to the restriction variables themselves. The results found in 
this paper, namely a significant reaction exchange rate deviation, foreign rates and high 
degree of policy inertia, measured by the lagged interest rate coefficient, and confirms the 
results in Aizenman et al. (2011), Caputo and Herrera (2013) and Clarida et al. (1998). 
The second purpose of this paper was to assess if the determinates of central bank policy rules 
have changed after the recent financial crisis, therefore the sample was divided into a pre- and 
post-crisis period. Here the results suggest that emerging market central banks seem to react 
to the interaction of the variables reflecting restrictions to capital in- and outflows with the 
exchange rate deviations, whereas advanced economies central banks seem to react to capital 
inflows. However, the results are somewhat inconclusive but suggest that after crisis inflation 
targeting central banks seem to consider restrictions to capital flows in some sense as well as 
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foreign rates and exchange rate deviations. The results supports Ostry et al. (2010) conclusion 
that capital controls may be are a legitimate part of policy response. 
For future research one interesting extension would be to look at the effects of controls on 
capital in- and outflows on a more disaggregate level, a possibility offered by the Schindler 
index. Thus, offering the possibility to see which type of capital control that is part of the 
policy response. 
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Appendix A: Country overview 
Table A1 and A2 describes the countries included in the sample. The classification of 
countries into advanced and emerging market economies is based on the classification in 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook 2014. According to WEO 2014 Colombia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Ukraine and Venezuela are classified as emerging market economies and Taiwan and 
the following euro zone countries are classified as advanced economies; Estonia, Luxembourg 
and Slovakia. However, these are not included in the Schindler index (Venezuela are included 
in the Schindler index, but was excluded due to problems with data availability) and therefore 
restrict the sample to the countries presented in table A1 and A2. 
Table A1: Advanced economies sample 
Inflation-targeters Year of adopting inflation 
targeting 
Non-targeters 
Australia 1993 Austria 
Canada 1991 Belgium 
Czech Republic 1998 Cyprus 
Iceland 2001 Denmark 
Israel 1992 Finland 
Korea 1998 France 
New Zealand 1990 Germany 
Norway 2001 Greece 
Sweden 1995 Hong Kong 
Switzerland 2000 Ireland 
United Kingdom 1992 Italy 
  Japan 
  Malta 
  Netherlands 
  Portugal 
  Singapore 
  Slovenia 
  Spain 
Source: Central banks’ websites for inflation targeting start dates and IMF’s WEO 2014 
 
Table A2: Emerging markets sample 
Inflation-targeters Year of adopting inflation 
targeting 
Non-targeters 
Brazil 1999 Argentina 
Chile 1999 Bulgaria 
Hungary 2001 China 
Indonesia 2001 India 
Mexico 2001 Latvia 
Peru 2002 Malaysia 
Philippines 2002 Pakistan 
Romania 2005 Russia 
South Africa 2000  
Thailand 2000  
Turkey 2006  
Source: Central banks’ websites for inflation targeting start dates and IMF’s WEO 2014 
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Appendix B: Data details 
Table B1 covers the definition and source of the main variables whereas Table B2 and 
accompanying text describes the Schindler index. 
Table B1: Data details 
Variable Definition Source 
CPI inflation Author’s calculation of the time difference of log CPI. IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics 
database 
Interest rate Data on the money market rate has been used as a 
proxy for short-term nominal interest rate, where 
unavailable data on the discount rate has been used. 
IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics 
database 
Output gap  Author’s calculations using WDI data on real GDP 
(constant 2005 US$) and trend GDP (calculated using 
Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 100). 
World Bank’s World 
Development 
Indicators 
Real effective exchange rate 
change  
Authors’ calculations using IFS real effective exchange 
rate data and trend real exchange rate (calculated using 
Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 100) 
and where unavailable nominal exchange rates and CPI 
from the IFS,. An increase in the real exchange rate is a 
real depreciation. 
IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics 
database 
US money market rate   IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics 
database 
 
Schindler index 
The Schindler index measures de jure restrictions on cross-border financial transactions and 
was originally constructed for 91 countries covering the period 1995 to 2005. The advantage 
of this index over other capital control indices is the possibility of using information at a more 
disaggregated level. This structure allows for the construction of several sub-indices, such as 
those for individual asset categories, for residents and nonresidents, and the sub-index used in 
this paper; restrictions on the direction of capital flows. The Schindler index is based on the 
on information in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER) published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The information in the 
AREAER is coded at the level of restrictions for resident and nonresident, in binary form 
taking a value of 0 if unrestricted and 1 if restricted. 
Since the Schindler index publicly available only covers the period 1995-2005, and in order to 
cover the recent financial crisis I have extended the index forward until 2012 for my entire 
sample. The index is also extended backwards for five inflation targeters (Australia, Canada, 
Israel, New Zealand and United Kingdom) that adopted the regime before 1995, the index 
extends back until the start year of inflation targeting for each of the five countries. Following 
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the methodology presented in Schindler 2009 my restriction variables are calculated as 
described in table B2. Furthermore, for each country in each asset category, inflow 
restrictions are calculated as the average of the restriction dummies on ‘‘purchase locally by 
nonresidents’’ and ‘‘sale or issue abroad by residents,’’ whereas outflow restrictions are 
calculated as the average of the restriction dummies on ‘‘purchase abroad by residents’’ and 
‘‘sale or issue locally by nonresidents”. For example if in a given year a country has a 
restriction on the sale of shares abroad by its residents but no restrictions for the purchase of 
sales by nonresidents, then eqi = 0.5. 
 
Table B2: Calculation of restrictions on directions of flows 
1997-2012 
    
                           
 
      
                       
 
  
eqi equity inflow restriction eqo equity outflow restriction 
boi bond inflow restriction boo bond outflow restriction 
cii collective investment inflow 
restriction 
cio collective investment outflow restriction 
mmi money market inflow restriction mmo money market outflow restriction 
fci financial credit inflow restriction fco financial credit outflow restriction 
dii_ldi max(dii; ldi) dio direct investment outflow restriction 
dii direct investment inflow restriction   
ldi direct investment liquidation 
restriction 
  
1990-1997 
    
                       
 
      
                   
 
  
Source: IMF’s AREAER 1991-1995, 2006-2013, Schindler 2009 
Until 1995, the AREAER summarized a country’s openness to capital flows using a binary 
dummy variable, where 1 represents a restricted capital account and 0 represents an 
unrestricted capital account. However, since 1995, the AREAER has utilized a more 
structured approached, providing detailed information on restrictions on capital transactions 
in a number of subcategories, which is the reason why the calculations differ slightly before 
and after 1997. 
